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Gödel's theorem does not need an introduction. But it is generally not 
acknowledged that all instances  of Gödel's sentence are vacuous (see below). 
On the contrary Aristotelian logic permits only sentences that are not 
vacuous. The consequences of these observations are surprising.
What does the article title mean? First of all by “Aristotelian logic” we will 
understand the logic of the traditional syllogism. By “classical logic” we will 
mean modern symbolic logic. It is well known that the laws of Aristotelian 
logic are valid only if all the terms refer to non-empty sets.
Traditional Aristotelian logic recognizes four types of sentences
A: All F are G
E: No F is G
I: Some F are G
O: Some F are not G
 
Certain relationships are said to hold between these types. For example A and
E are contraries. It means that both cannot be true, but both can be false. 
Here the modern logicians spotted a problem. Suppose that we interpret the 
four types as in Table 1 below.
A: ~(∃x)(Fx & ~Gx)
E: ~(∃x)(Fx & Gx)
I: (∃x)(Fx & Gx)
O: (∃x)(Fx & ~Gx)
Table 1
Suppose further that F is empty, i.e. that ~(∃x)Fx. Then according to classical 
logic both A and E will be true. The above interpretation [Table 1] does not 
hold. The issue was analyzed by P. F. Strawson. (Strawson, 1952, pp. 163-179) 
He showed that given the interpretation below
A: ~(∃x)(Fx & ~Gx) & (∃x)Fx & (∃x)~Gx
E: ~(∃x)(Fx & Gx) & (∃x)Fx & (∃x)Gx
I: (∃x)(Fx & Gx) v ~(∃x)Fx v ~(∃x)Gx
O: (∃x)(Fx & Gx) v ~(∃x)Fx v ~(∃x~)Gx
Table 2
all the laws of the traditional syllogism will hold. (Strawson, 1952, p. 173) 
Traditional logic assumes that the subject term refers to something that does 
exist. However, the formulae in Table 2 are implausible translations of the 
natural language sentences. (Strawson, 1952, p. 173) So he proposed to take 
the term (∃x)Fx as a presupposition. It means that ~(Ex)Fx does not imply that
A is false, but rather (Ex)Fx “is a necessary precondition not merely of of the 
truth of what is said, but of its being either true or false.” [Original italics] 
(Strawson, p. 174) We will, however, do one better and take the entire (∃x)Fx 
& (Ex)~Gx as the presupposition. Then A is neither true nor false if (∃x)Fx & 
(∃x)~Gx is not true. For our purposes it is important to note that there is no 
such thing as a vacuously true proposition. Vacuous propositions are by 
definition neither true nor false.
Such a logic can be formalized. This can be accomplished by generalizing 
truth-relevant logic (Diaz, 1981) to the predicate calculus.  In this logic the 
sentences
(P & ~P) → Q
~(P & ~P) v Q
~((P & ~P) & ~Q)
are not truth-relevant tautologies (Diaz, 1981, p. 67.) Similarly in Strawson's 
logic the sentences
(x)(Fx → Gx)
(x)(~Fx v Gx)
~(∃x)(Fx & ~Gx)
are not true if ~(∃x)Fx. (Nor are they false.)
The author of truth-relevant logic probably never realized that his system was 
a propositional counterpart of the traditional Aristotelian logic! He arrived at 
it from a different angle, the angle of relevance. But truth-relevant logic can 
be extended not only to monadic predicate calculus but also to the logic of 
relations. (Newberry, 2014)
* * * * *
Let us now turn our attention to the diagonal lemma and in particular to 
Gödel's theorem. In Peano Arithmetic there exists a decidable relation 
Diag(y,z) such that if y is the Gödel number of a formula with one free variable
then z is the Gödel number number of the formula obtained from y by 
substituting (the numeral of) the Gödel number of y for the free variable in y. 
Further let Prf(x,z) be a predicate such that x is the Gödel number of a 
sequence that is a proof of the sentence with  Gödel number z. Then consider 
the formula  
    ~(∃x)(∃z)(Prf(x,z) & Diag(y,z)) (U)
with one free variable y. Let the constant k be the Gödel number of U. We 
substitute k for the free variable y in U. We obtain
    ~(∃x)(∃z)(Prf(x,z) & Diag(k,z)) (G)
As a result of this construction Diag(k,z) is satisfied only by the Gödel number 
of G. We will denote the Gödel number of G as '<G>'. Then according to 
classical logic G is equivalent to
~(∃x)Prf(x, <G>) (H)
and thus
  ~(∃x)(∃z)(Prf(x,z) & Diag(k,z))  ↔  ~(∃x)Prf(x,<G>) (J)
The sentence (J) above is an instance of the diagonal lemma also known as the
fixed point theorem. We replaced the free variable z in ~(∃x)Prf(x,z) with the 
Gödel number of some sentence φ such that  φ ↔ ~(∃x)Prf(x,<φ>). In this case
φ happens to be G.  
Now we are coming to the crux of the matter. Let us "unroll" G:
~(∃x)(Prf(x,1) & Diag(k, 1)) 
~(∃x)(Prf(x,2) & Diag(k, 2))
~(∃x)(Prf(x,3) & Diag(k, 3))
. . .
For any n either ~(∃x)(Prf(x,n) or ~(∃x)Diag(k, n). Given the following 
equalities
~(∃x)(Prf(x,n) & Diag(k,n))  <=>   
(x)(Prf(x,n) -> ~Diag(k,n))   <=>  
(x)(Diag(k,n) -> ~Prf(x,n)) 
we find that if n = <G> then 
(x)(Prf(x,n) -> ~Diag(k,n))
is vacuous,  else if ~(n = <G>) then 
(x)(Diag(k,n) -> ~Prf(x,n))
is vacuous. So let n = <G>:
~(∃x)(Prf(x,<G>) & Diag(k,<G>))           (K)
According to the logic of presuppositions both terms in K must refer to non-
empty sets. In particular (∃x)Prf(x,<G>) must hold; it is a presupposition of K. 
That is, if ~(∃x)Prf(x,<G>) then K cannot be true! The equivalence J no longer
holds. By cutting the Gordian knot we are able to say that G is not true even 
though G cannot say it of itself.
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